I. Introduction
In the early 1990s, installing shareholder advisory committees in ailing companies was the idée du jour among shareholder activists across the United States. 1 However, the wave of shareholder proposals that sought to establish such committees quickly subsided, and corporate governance reform took a different path. Twenty years later, on the other side of the Atlantic, Switzerland is experiencing a popular backlash against the perceived mismanagement of public firms, and especially against high executive pay.
2 As a consequence, Professors Peter Forstmoser, Stephan Hostettler and Hans-Ueli Vogt have made a reform proposal which they hope will preempt interventionist legislation: They recommend the creation of shareholder committees.
3
Professors Forstmoser, Hostettler and Vogt view shareholder committees as the "missing link" between shareholders and management, which would improve communication between the two groups and give shareholders more influence on the shaping of board decisions. The authors envision that shareholder committees either act upon any subject-matter they deem appropriate, or focus on specific issues, such as compensation, lawsuits against directors and officers, or fundamental decisions on strategy and organization. Thereby, shareholder committees shall have the power to make proposals to the board and to make recommenda- tions to shareholders. According to the proposal, committee members could either receive confidential information and would then have the same fiduciary duties as directors, or they could be barred from receiving confidential information and in this case would not be subject to fiduciary duties.
In this paper, I evaluate the costs and benefits of shareholder committees from a policy perspective. My analysis rests on the premise that the policy goal of corporate governance is to enable actors to maximize the value of the corporation. I focus on widely-held corporations because all existing proposals to establish shareholder committees relate to this kind of company. This is not to say, though, that it would not be interesting to inquire whether minority shareholder committees could potentially protect investors against a controlling shareholder, be it a controlling family, a business foundation, or the state.
In Part II, I retrace the history of the concept of the shareholder committee as a corporate governance institution in the United States. The idea had most of its traction in the early 1990s, when institutional shareholders were trying to find their role in corporate governance. However, it has not been particularly successful, and it lost its momentum as the general focus of corporate governance reform shifted towards reforming the board.
In Part III, I outline the dimensions in which shareholder committees may vary. The spectrum of possibilities in designing shareholder committees is very broad and ranges from a board-appointed shareholder focus group to a "shadow board," which is empowered to monitor directors and managers. All existing proposals for shareholder committees occupy the middle ground between these two extremes. Given that the spectrum of design choices for shareholder committees is so broad, it is impossible to draw a bright line between a shareholder committee and a monitoring body at board level.
In Part IV, I assess the potential benefits of shareholder committees. I conclude that we should not expect shareholder committees to mitigate the collective action problem of shareholders. Nor is it likely that a shareholder committee will reduce managerial agency costs to a notable extent. The potential for savings in information and communication costs is small. Finally, shareholder committees cannot be expected to greatly enhance the equality of shareholders' access to information.
In Part V, I assess the potential costs of shareholder committees. I conclude that the costs of establishing and maintaining a shareholder committee may not be overwhelming, but they are not trivial compared with the limited benefits of such a committee.
In Part VI, I conclude that shareholder committees are unlikely to have greater benefits than costs. Although I expect few companies to be willing to implement Professors Forstmoser, Hostettler and Vogt's proposal, I agree that companies should be able to experiment with different types of shareholder committees. Therefore, the restrictions that Swiss law currently places on the appointment of shareholder committees should be lifted. It should be up to shareholders to decide whether the concept of the shareholder committee is a blind alley or a vital branch in the evolution of corporate governance institutions.
II. Shareholder Committees in the United States
Shareholder committees have not been a success story in the United States. The idea's precursors can be traced back to the 1900s. Shareholder committees had a brief heyday in the 1990s, in which they also received significant scholarly attention. However, corporate governance reform went down a different path, and the idea has slipped off the radar of U.S. corporate governance scholars.
A. Precursors
In 1863, a medical doctor named James C. Ayer from Lowell, Massachusetts, published a pamphlet on the "Usages and Abuses in the Management of Our Manufacturing Corporations," in which he reported, among other things, that the shareholders of several companies had established special committees to investigate conflicted transactions and other instances of alleged wrongdoing by managers. 4 Dr. Ayer was not the only alert shareholder, however. In fact, shareholder committees seem to have been common in the second half of the 19 th century.
5
More than a hundred years after Dr. Ayer's pamphlet, in 1970, a non-profit organization called the Project on Corporate Responsibility launched a campaign 4 James C. Ayer, SOME OF THE USES AND ABUSES IN THE MANAGEMENT OF OUR MANUFACTUR-ING CORPORATIONS 5-13 (Lowell, MA, C. M. Langley & Co. 1863). In two out of the three cases cited by Dr. Ayer, the committees found wrongdoing and wrote a detailed report, but the report did not have any practical consequences (id. at 6-8 and 12-13). In the third case, the president of the company appointed candidates loyal to him to the committee and the investigation led nowhere (id. at 5). 6 against General Motors (the so-called Campaign GM), in which it sought, among other things, to create a shareholder committee on social responsibility. 6 The Campaign GM received considerable public attention, not least because consumer protection activist Ralph Nader had endorsed it.
7
In parallel to these developments, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 introduced the so-called committee of equity securities holders. In a Chapter 11 reorganization, the bankruptcy court may order the appointment of a committee of the seven largest equity securities holders willing to serve. 8 The functions of such a committee are to provide access to information for shareholders and to solicit comments from them.
9

B. The Short Heyday of the Shareholder Committee
The idea of using shareholder committees to improve corporate governance was conceived in the mid-1980s, after institutional investors had become the dominant type of shareholder. (1996) .
11
One of the first proposals, made by Mr. Travis Reed, Jr., adopted the Bankruptcy Code's formula that the committee comprise representatives of the seven largest shareholders willing to serve. See Rock, supra note 1, at 491. Barnard suggests that Calpers' officials were inspired by their experience in a Chapter 11 case to take the equity holders committee outside of bankruptcy law. See Barnard, supra note 1, at 1145. 12 See Rock, supra note 1, at 490-492, for an overview and further references. 13 See USEEM, supra note 10, 227 (stating that the idea reached an "early (and not particularly high) watermark" in the early 1990s). 7 created a "Shareholders Enhancement Committee" for USX (as U.S. Steel was named at the time 15 ). 16 Icahn, who owned 13% of the company, appointed experts to the committee who were to conduct an analysis of the company's business and announced that the committee members would run for the board unless USX enacted a restructuring plan and changed its corporate governance. 17 In contrast to this, a typical Calpers proposal provided for a committee of nine members, a majority of whom were to be selected among the largest shareholders, and reimbursement of expenses. 18 The committee would provide "nonbinding, advisory counsel" to the board on any subject it deemed appropriate, and act as a conduit between the company and its largest shareholders. REV. 1970 REV. , 1980 REV. (1997 . 24 The data about the margins of rejection vary. Rock mentions two examples which received more than 40 % of the vote. Rock, supra note 1, at 491. Useem reports that most proposals received less than 20%. USEEM, supra note 10, at 227. the proposals came from public pension funds, which exclusively targeted companies which they believed to be poorly managed. 25 Therefore, an endorsement of the proposal by the company would have meant a concession that the company was indeed poorly managed. 26 Moreover, few shareholder advisory committees were established due to their frequent usage as bargaining chips in negotiations over other aspects of corporate governance. This is most obvious with respect to Carl Icahn's attempt to change the strategy of USX, yet the same is true for many Calpers proposals, which it withdrew when the company had made other concessions on corporate governance. 27 At least in one case, at Lockheed, things played out the other way, as management agreed to establish a shareholders' advisory committee in consideration of Calpers' support at fending off a hostile tender offer.
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C. Scholarly Reactions
In the early 1990s, shareholder committees caught the attention of corporate governance scholars. These discussions were part of the broader debate about the appropriate role of institutional investors in corporate governance, 29 which coincided with a great deal of academic interest in alternative governance structures of the public corporation, such as the German and Japanese two-tier board structures. 
9
Commentators were not exactly enthusiastic about shareholder committees. Professors Gilson and Kraakman argued that shareholder advisory committees "would merely formalize existing management-shareholder exchanges in many companies," 31 and that there would be a danger of creating a "shadow board,"
which "would suffer from all of the structural shortcomings that critics have identified in actual boards, while exercising none of an actual board's power."
32
Professor Rock classified shareholder committees according to their functions as "general purpose monitor," "general purpose voice," and "special purpose committees."
33 Concerning the monitoring function, he agrees with Professors
Gilson and Kraakman that it would be pointless to create a shadow board. 34 He is less pessimistic, though, with respect to the function of bundling shareholder voice: Although he does see some problems, 35 he concludes that "even a general purpose advisory committee has substantial potential to alter the balance of power between shareholders and managers." 36 As to special purpose committees, which he envisions to decide on the most conflicted transactions, 37 he states that they would be a "welcome innovation" in light of the shortcomings of existing practices in solving the agency and coordination problems in these contexts. 38 In spite of these advantages, Professor Rock's verdict is that "shareholders' advisory committees, though potentially promising as an incremental step towards resolving some particularly sensitive corporate governance issues, seem unlikely to usher in any basic change in corporate governance."
39
Professor Barnard evaluated three possible functions of shareholder committees, namely a "consultative function," in which the committee reviews board Rock, supra note 1, at 501.
37
He mentions the examples of a sale or of pursuing a derivative claim: Id. at 501.
38
Id. at 502-503.
39
Id. at 506.
proposals, a monitoring function, and a function as information conduit to and from the board. 40 Being particularly skeptical about the first two functions, she doubts whether "shareholders would be 'better off' with an advisory committee," 41 In particular, shareholders are exempted from filing a form 14A when they solicit proxies from no more than ten shareholders (17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(2)(b) (2011)), when they merely announce how they intend to vote ( § 240.14a-1(1)(2)(iv) (2011)), and when they conduct "withhold See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 29, at 883-892 (advocating the creation of a pool of professionals from which institutional investors could recruit outside directors for their portfolio companies); Barnard, supra note 1, at 1168 (recommending the placement of institutional representatives on boards); Black, supra note 29, at 842-844 (advocating, among other board reforms, the placement of institutional directors on boards). ers, 49 the stock exchanges cemented important features of the independent monitoring board: Among other things, companies must have audit, compensation and nominating committees, which have to be composed entirely of independent directors, and independence is assessed by a tightened standard. 50 At the same time, empirical studies found that director independence was not correlated with the valuation of companies.
51
Even during the time that corporate governance reform focused on boards, however, the idea of the shareholder committee was not completely forgotten. In 2003, Professor Dorff suggested the establishment of random shareholder committees consisting of a small group of retail shareholders. 52 A random shareholder committee would have to engage with the chair of the board's compensation committee, so that the chair identifies with stockholders and develops a sense of responsibility towards them, and will (hopefully) refrain from granting executives excessive pay packages. 
E. Conclusions
There is no uniform concept of a shareholder committee, even in its modern, corporate governance-oriented form. The idea has been around in the United States for roughly twenty-five years, and it had the most of its traction in the early 1990s when institutional shareholders were trying to find their role in corporate governance. Overall, the idea has not been particularly successful, and it lost its momentum as the general focus of corporate governance reform shifted towards reforming the board and empowering shareholders. Hence, shareholder committees appear to have been a blind alley in the evolution of U.S. corporate governance institutions.
III. Design Choices
The concept of a shareholder committee has been criticized for its obscurity as regards the designated role of such a committee. 57 The perceived obscurity may be less due to the vagueness of ideas than to the lack of a clear view of the range of options in the design of a shareholder committee. Cf. Rock, supra note 1, at 498 (remarking that "the role proposed for such committees by their proponents remains obscure"). See Rock, supra note 1, at 501 (referring to the sale of the company and lawsuits against directors and officers); Forstmoser, Hostettler & Vogt, supra note 3, at 31 (referring to lawsuits against directors and officers). Id. (speaking of "access" to confidential information).
15 power or if they receive privileged information. 69 Moreover, they will need to be reimbursed for their expenses, if not be paid for their services.
70
B. Composition, Eligibility, Term of Office
The design choices concerning the composition of a shareholder committee relate to the number of members, eligibility for the office, the way in which members are selected, and the term of office. Proposals as to the number of members range from three 71 to nine or more. 72 Suggestions as to who should be eligible for committee membership range from small shareholders only 73 to anyone who holds shares above a certain modest threshold 74 to only the largest shareholders. 75 Some proponents suggest that a portion of seats be reserved for the largest stockholders. 76 Others recommend a minimal holding period. 77 It seems natural to have shareholders elect the committee-after all, it is called a shareholder committee. However, if a board wants to establish a shareholder committee to inform the board about shareholder sentiment, it might appoint committee members-or some of them 78 -itself. A third possibility, which is favored by scholars who do not see shareholder committees primarily as a means to empower institutional shareholders, is to select members randomly. 79 The suggested terms of office range from one year to three years and could be renewable or not.
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Id. (stating that if committee members receive confidential information, they should have the same fiduciary duties as board members). 70 See McConvill & Bagaric, supra note 44, at 142 (suggesting reimbursement and a small remuneration fee); Dorff, supra note 52, at 879 (suggesting that the randomly selected small shareholders be compensated "at a fairly generous daily rate"). The Calpers proposals of 1990 provided for reimbursement of expenses only. See Barnard, supra note 1, at 1139, with further references. 
C. Implementation
Thus far, only two possible ways of getting companies to adopt shareholder committees have been discussed: making a shareholder committee mandatory for all listed companies 81 and allowing companies to opt into such a committee 82 .
There are, however, two intermediate solutions. First, one might consider a statutory opt-out. 83 Second, an opt-in statute could be accompanied by a disclosure rule that obliges companies to explain themselves if they do not establish a shareholder committee ("comply or explain").
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D. The Spectrum of Choices and Definitional Questions
This brief overview of the design specifications of a shareholder committee shows how broad the spectrum of possibilities is. At the one end of the spectrum, one could imagine a committee set up by the board whose sole purpose is to give the board feedback about shareholder sentiments, without having any special powers. Its members would neither have access to confidential information nor fiduciary duties. This type of shareholder committee would essentially be a focus group of shareholders, just like market researchers use focus groups to receive feedback on a company's products. 85 At the other end of the spectrum, a share- Advocates of a mandatory shareholder committee are McConvill & Bagaric, supra note 44, at 167. Dorff suggested that his idea be tested among a random sample of companies, from which I infer that he favors mandatory rules if the experiment is successful. Dorff, supra note 52, at 891. 82 Forstmoser, Hostettler & Vogt, supra note 3, at 31, propose such an opt-in solution. 83 An opt-out might suggest itself under Bebchuk and Hamdani's reversible defaults approach, according to which a statutory default should be restrictive to managers when it is uncertain whether a corporate governance arrangement is efficient and the collective action problem of shareholders is severe enough to prevent them from opting out of a manager-friendly default. They justify their approach by pointing out that the costs of overriding a default are lower when management has incentives to initiate the default override. holder committee could be given the power to approve or veto certain board resolutions, including director nominations, to enact policies that are binding to the board, to make proposals to shareholders, and to access confidential information. Its members would necessarily have fiduciary duties. In effect, such a committee would be nothing short of a "shadow board." 86 Existing proposals for shareholder committees occupy the middle ground between the two extremes, focusing on the committee's role as an information conduit and on its involvement in some of the most conflicted board decisions.
87
The breadth of the concept of a shareholder committee raises the question of what distinguishes a structure in which a board is monitored by a powerful shareholder committee from such structures as the German and Japanese two-tier boards 88 or Professor Dallas' idea of a dual board, a structure consisting of a conflicts board and a business review board, which have different functions, but equal status. 89 In fact, there is no bright line between these structures. It is a question of terminology whether a monitoring body is called a shareholder committee, a supervisory board, or something else. 90 Likewise, it is a matter of definition where the line is drawn between such a monitoring body (whatever its name) and a shareholder committee that has more limited functions. Thus, there seems to be less of a dichotomy between a board and a shareholder committee than some commentators may believe. 
See supra text accompanying notes 3, 19, 53, and 55.
88
For references see supra note 30. 89 See Dallas, supra note 30. The conflicts board would consist of independent directors. Id. at 114-116. The conflicts board would nominate director candidates, set executive compensation, hire and fire executive officers, select an auditor, approve conflicted transactions, decide on control changes, oversee auditing and financial reporting, monitor legal compliance, and set ethical standards. Id. at 117-122. The business review board would comprise inside and independent expert directors. Id. at 122. It would oversee business and management, and review, initiate or approve strategy, financial objectives, and major non-conflicted transactions. Id. at 122-123. Both boards would have a right to obtain reports from the other board and from employees. Id. at 124.
90
As Professor Forstmoser has noted, the board itself was originally thought to be a shareholder committee. Peter Cf. Black, supra note 29, at 844 footnote 90 (stating that shareholder advisory committees are a poor substitute for institutional directors); Barnard, supra note 1, at 1168 (recommending that reform focus on the board itself instead of shareholder committees).
IV. Potential Benefits
Shareholder committees offer several potential benefits. They could mitigate the collective action problem among shareholders, lower the agency costs of the board of directors and top management, improve board decisions, lower the communication costs between the board and shareholders, and have the benefits ascribed to a formalization of informal contacts between shareholders and managers. Each of these potential benefits varies depending on a shareholder committee's functions and powers.
A. Mitigation of Collective Action Problem
Shareholder committees may be viewed as mitigating the collective action problem among shareholders. 92 Scholars are quite optimistic that shareholder committees have this potential. For instance, Professor Rock argues that shareholder committees "may significantly moderate the collective action problem facing shareholders." 93 Advocates of shareholder committees do not explicitly mention collective action problems, but they apparently believe that shareholder committees are an appropriate means of empowering shareholders to monitor the board better or to make their voice heard by the board. 94 Skeptics mostly question the committees' capacity of performing these tasks, 95 but do not dispute the premise of their point: that a shareholder committee has incentives to perform whatever functions are assigned to it, while the shareholders themselves may not. See supra text accompanying notes 3, 19, 53, and 55. 95 See, e.g., Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 29, at 872; Black, supra note 29, at 844 footnote 90; BOHRER, supra note 34, at § § 146 and 148. 96 Dorff and Bohrer take a different stance with regard to the information conduit function of a shareholder committee. They dispute-in my opinion, quite rightly-that there is a collective action problem in the first place because boards and large investors already maintain informal contacts. See Dorff, supra note 52, at 883 (suggesting to bar large institutional shareholders from serving on a random shareholder committee because they already meet informally with management); BOHRER, supra note 34, at § 147 (suggesting that the largest investors would prefer to communicate their views to the board directly, not via a shareholder committee). Proponents of a "general voice" committee prefer to formalize the contacts between boards and large investors.
Because shareholder committees can only mitigate collective action problems to the extent that they do not face such a problem themselves, we need to determine first whether a shareholder committee itself faces a collective action problem. That depends on the collective action required from the shareholders in connection with the formation and the operation of a committee.
The collective action problems associated with the formation of a shareholder committee are quite different depending on the way a committee is formed. If shareholders have to take the initiative to put a committee in place, the collective action problem might be big enough to prevent a committee from being formed, 97 unless the gain in shareholder value of having a committee is large enough to make it rational for the largest stockholder or group of stockholders to shoulder the costs alone. At this point, it is important to note that the costs of shareholder action are to a large extent determined by legal requirements, such as the SEC rules concerning shareholder proposals in the United States, 98 and minimum shareholding requirements for shareholder proposals in Switzerland. 99 One way of mitigating the collective action problem without changing those legal requirements would be to mandate shareholder committees or to establish shareholder committees by default, with a possibility to opt out. 100 However, these measures would place a cost burden on companies that would not benefit from having a shareholder committee, and these costs may be greater than the benefits for those companies that would benefit from it.
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When it comes to serving on a shareholder committee, there should be no collective action problem in theory, since the shareholders who serve on the commit- In Switzerland, the right to make proposals is limited to shareholders (or groups of shareholders) owning the lower of 10% or 1 million Swiss Franks in nominal capital. CODE OF OBLIGA-TIONS art. 699(3) (Switz.). 100 Shareholder committees which are convened by the board as mere focus groups are not faced with a collective action problem, either.tee can be reimbursed or paid for their services. However, as Professor Rock points out, investors who trade in the stock of the company 102 may not have incentives to serve if they thus come to be regarded as statutory insiders under § 16(a) and § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
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This claim rests on the assumptions that investors cannot be fully compensated for the loss in liquidity stemming from the trading restrictions imposed by securities law, and that this is the case for all stockholders whose membership on the committee would be desirable. These assumptions are quite strong. If they are correct, shareholder committees whose members receive inside information would likely face a collective action problem. This problem would be smaller with respect to special committees that exist for a limited duration than with respect to permanent committees.
104
Even if enough stockholders have sufficient incentives to serve on a shareholder committee or to send a delegate, there is still no good reason to believe that a shareholder committee will mitigate the collective action problems that shareholders face today. I do not see a basis for the literature's optimism in this regard 105 because the collective action that shareholders need to take with respect to
B. Lower Agency Costs
To the extent that a shareholder committee has monitoring functions, its purpose is to reduce the agency costs that result from the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers. 106 As mentioned, a shareholder committee's monitoring function may be general or restricted to specific tasks or transactions.
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While even the most ardent supporters of shareholder committees have not suggested that shareholder committees monitor managers generally, many proponents recommend that shareholder committees get involved in those matters which are presumably the most conflict-prone, such as the nomination of directors and top managers, the setting of executive compensation, the pursuit of derivative claims, and the sale of the company. 108 Today, these tasks are bestowed upon independent directors, either via board committees 109 or otherwise. 110 Thus, the question arises whether a shareholder committee is in a better position to monitor managers and to decide on conflicted issues than outside directors or independent board committees. Commentators deny this unanimously. Their biggest objection is that a shareholder committee will not have more information than outside directors. 111 Additionally, critics expect shareholder committee members to have similar time constraints and a potential lack of expertise than outside directors.
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There can be little doubt that the tradeoff between independence and insider knowledge that limits the effectiveness of outside directors 113 also applies to shareholder committees. Even if a shareholder committee has the power to compel the disclosure of confidential information, the costs of acquiring this informa-tion will often be prohibitive because the committee might not know what to ask for-there will be "unknown unknowns" 114 -and time constraints prevent committee members from collecting sufficient information. On the other hand, a shareholder committee's monitoring capacity might be increased due to its greater accountability to shareholders. It is widely acknowledged that boards, through their nominating committees, actually co-opt their members, and that the CEO has considerable power to block director nominations. 115 Thus, outside directors may be more accountable to managers than to shareholders. Members of a shareholder committee who are nominated and paid 116 by shareholders are less likely to be conflicted in that way. All other things being equal, they may therefore be better monitors than outside directors. However, the increased accountability of shareholder committee members depends crucially on the capacity of shareholders to select and nominate candidates despite their collective action. If the obstacles to collective action in this regard can be removed, we would expect the accountability of outside directors to increase as well, because the collective action required from shareholders with respect to a board is no more demanding than with respect to a shareholder committee. Put bluntly, to the extent that a collective action problem prevents shareholders from installing accountable monitors, a shareholder committee will be useless, and to the extent that the collective action problem does not exist, a shareholder committee will be unnecessary.
There is one qualification to the prevailing pessimism regarding a shareholder committee's capacity to monitor managers. Even a shareholder committee that acts in a purely advisory capacity may exert a subtle form of monitoring vis-à-vis directors and managers. As Professor Rock, who is otherwise a skeptic of shareholder committees, put it, it would be risky for the board to ignore a shareholder 116 The nominating shareholder would need to be reimbursed by the company for the remuneration it pays to the committee member. committee's recommendations, which is why "even a general purpose advisory committee has substantial potential to alter the balance of power between shareholders and managers."
117 Even when a shareholder committee does not make specific recommendations, directors and officers are required to communicate with the committee, and these exchanges can hardly be as non-committal as statements to the public. Therefore, directors and officers may find it difficult to back down from the declarations and self-commitments they make to the committee. 118 Moreover, the existence of a shareholder committee, if it is not mandated by law, is in itself a signal that shareholders have an eye on corporate governance and might thus deter certain actions by directors and officers that will likely destroy shareholder value. Ultimately, it is an empirical question whether a shareholder committee is in a better position to monitor corporate insiders than outside directors or independent board committees. In the light of the foregoing analysis, however, I would not make a bet that a shareholder committee would reduce managerial agency costs to a sizeable extent.
C. Lower Information and Communication Costs
To the extent that a shareholder committee serves as an information conduit between shareholders and the board, it may decrease the information and communication costs between the two groups. This rationale comes in two flavors.
First, some proponents emphasize the potential of shareholder committees to decrease the information costs that shareholders incur when they evaluate board performance. 119 However, many large shareholders already engage with boards informally, and there are reasons to believe that they would continue to do so even if a shareholder committee is in place. 120 Direct exchanges offer shareholders greater flexibility in terms of timing and agenda setting. Depending on the magnitude of these advantages, large shareholders may not even have incentives to serve on a committee. 121 Additionally, board performance is increasingly being evaluated by proxy advisers such as MSCI/RiskMetrics, Glass Lewis, and, in Switzerland, Ethos Services. 122 These intermediaries may have economies of scale compared to a shareholder committee of a single company because they can use their evaluation tools to evaluate the governance of a large number of companies. Therefore, information cost savings on the part of shareholders that spring from a shareholder committee should not be overestimated. As a second rationale, advocates of shareholder committees point to the potential cost savings when boards have the opportunity to engage with shareholders who are organized in a committee, instead of having to contact them individually. 123 Thus, the argument goes, the quality of board decisions could be improved. 124 This rationale is equally questionable. Nothing prevents boards from setting up shareholder focus groups should they believe that they do not have sufficient information about shareholder preferences. The reason why boards do not customarily do this might be that they do not need input from stockholders. The maximand-the value of the corporation-is sufficiently clear, and stockholders are not better informed than the board whether a particular decision is going to be value-increasing or not. Moreover, boards receive a great deal of feedback from investors through other channels, such as the stock price, informal meetings, or the media. Overall, the potential for information and communication cost savings by use of a shareholder committee seems minimal since shareholders and boards already 120 Cf. BOHRER, supra note 34, at § 147 (stating that large shareholders may prefer to engage with the board directly rather than via a shareholder committee). 121 For a discussion of other incentives to serve or not to serve on a committee see supra text accompanying notes 102 to 104. 123 See Forstmoser, Hostettler & Vogt, supra note 3, at 31 (stating that a shareholder committee would facilitate the board's access to shareholders, who are otherwise anonymous). 124 Id. (arguing that co-operation between shareholders and managers will optimize the quality of decision-making). Contra Barnard, supra note 1, at 1167 (arguing that a review of board decisions by a shareholder committee will improve the decisions).
have a broad range of information sources and communication channels at their disposal.
D. Formalization of Informal Shareholder Contacts
The last potential benefit of shareholder committees is not so much relevant to U.S. law than to Swiss law. Under Swiss corporate law, boards must treat shareholders equally. 125 This rule theoretically bars boards from giving some shareholders preferential access to information. 126 Hence, contrary to commentators in the United States, 127 the proponents of shareholder committees in Switzerland view the formalization of hitherto informal contacts between large shareholders and the board as a benefit. 128 As stated above, 129 it is doubtful whether shareholders have incentives not to communicate with directors and managers directly even if a shareholder committee is in place. A shareholder committee might channel some of the communication between shareholders and management, but it might not necessarily reduce the traditional, informal exchanges to a significant extent. If these informal exchanges are seen as a problem, one would have to ban them outright. I am not aware that this has ever been suggested.
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V. Potential Costs
Shareholder committees generate transaction costs and, as an additional body in an organization, they may generate agency costs of their own.
A. Transaction Costs
Shareholder committees cost money. Individual shareholders who serve on a committee need to be reimbursed for their expenses or paid for their services, and institutional shareholders that have delegated an agent to the committee must be reimbursed for their opportunity costs, including the time spent on evaluating candidates. If a shareholder committee exerts certain monitoring functions, it may be required to retain advisers, too, yet these costs may be merely shifted from a board committee to the shareholder committee. Furthermore, a shareholder committee will generate indirect opportunity costs, particularly the time spent by directors and officers on communicating with the committee.
It is an empirical question what amount of transaction costs a shareholder committee may generate. It may well be that the costs are small, especially if a committee mainly acts as an information conduit. 131 Yet even in these cases, the transaction costs may not be negligible when they are compared to the benefits of a shareholder committee, which may be quite marginal.
B. Agency Costs
Being a body of an organization, a shareholder committee may generate agency costs of its own. There might be slack on the part of committee members, or they may pursue an agenda that conflicts with the goal of maximizing the value of the corporation. With respect to the United States it has been predicted that shareholder committees would be dominated by public pension funds, 132 which have a reputation for pursuing their own political agenda. 133 (There is no comparable class of stockholder in Switzerland.) Furthermore, a problematic "advisory interlock" could emerge, that is, a situation in which representatives of the same institutions serve on multiple shareholder committees. 134 Even though it can hardly be denied that shareholder committees might generate agency costs of their own, it is important not to count costs twice. To the extent, namely, that such agency costs merely cause the committee to be ineffective, they are already counted above as transaction costs: The money spent on the committee will simply be wasted. Beyond that, it seems unlikely that a shareholder committee's agency costs will decrease firm value any further if adequate safeguards are in place. Election by shareholders should ensure that no candidate is elected who is incompetent or pursues a special agenda. 135 Additionally, agency costs can be mitigated through the compensation scheme of committee members. If those committee members who represent institutions are compensated by their principals, who will then be reimbursed by the corporation, they will be more accountable to their principals than to management than the average director.
VI. Conclusion: Let Shareholders Have the Final Word
My brief review of the potential benefits and costs of shareholder committees is sobering. We should not expect shareholder committees to mitigate the collective action problem of shareholders, and it is unlikely that they will reduce managerial agency costs to a notable extent. The potential for savings in information and communication costs is small, and shareholder committees are not necessarily going to provide shareholders with more equal access to information than they have now. In the light of these very limited benefits, the costs of establishing and maintaining a shareholder committee are not trivial.
For these reasons, I doubt whether it is in the best interest of public companies to adopt a shareholder committee, as Professors Forstmoser, Hostettler and Vogt seem to believe. However, I do not claim to know better than shareholders whether a shareholder committee would be in their interest. Given that shareholders will both reap the benefits and bear the costs of having a shareholder committee, it should be up to them to decide whether to adopt one. Yet currently,
